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Competitive Policy Development †
By Alexander V. Hirsch and Kenneth W. Shotts *
We present a model of policy development in which competing fac-
tions have different ideologies, yet agree on certain common objec-
tives. Policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making 
productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals. 
These investments are specific to a given proposal, which means that 
policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power. 
Competition undermines this agenda power, forcing policy develop-
ers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker. This benefi-
cial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological 
preferences, because their intense desire to affect policy motivates 
them to develop higher quality proposals. (JEL D72, D73, D78, E61)
During the early years of the New Deal, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
faced an enormous challenge. He believed that dramatic policy innovation was 
urgently needed on a wide range of issues, including agriculture, trade, banking, 
employment, and social insurance. However, although Roosevelt was well versed in 
policy, crafting workable proposals for such a far-reaching agenda was well beyond 
his capacity, or that of his immediate advisors. Instead, the president had to rely on a 
broader array of politicians and bureaucrats to develop new policies. Although these 
individuals shared some common goals (e.g., ending the Great Depression), they 
also had deep-seated ideological disagreements among themselves, and with the 
president, about what policies the federal government should pursue.
Classic and contemporary theories of bureaucratic politics would suggest that 
this situation was ripe for exploitation and inefficiency. Weber (1991) famously 
argued that the typical ruler of a modern state is reduced to being a “mere dilettante” 
when dealing with institutionalized bureaucratic actors. More recently,  scholars 
building on the work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) have argued that policymaking 
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is less effective when the experts who provide advice to a decision maker don’t 
share his goals. However, in contrast to these theoretical expectations, historians like 
Schlesinger (1958) and Leuchtenburg (1963) have argued that President Roosevelt 
was able to induce New Deal policy developers to craft initiatives that promoted his 
key policy objectives. Despite some failures along the way, what resulted was one 
of the most active periods of policy innovation in American history, and a profound 
reshaping of the role of the United States government.
A major reason credited with the apparent success of policy development during the 
New Deal was competition within the Roosevelt administration (Schlesinger 1958). 
Bureaucrats and advisors who sought to influence policy in accordance with their own 
preferences had to contend with others who favored different approaches. In trade pol-
icy, there was intense competition between proponents of quid pro quo deals versus 
proponents of the most favored nation principle. In public works, there was intense 
competition between those who favored shovel-ready projects, those who favored 
development of infrastructure, and those who wanted to minimize costs. And in the 
area of soil conservation, the Agriculture and Interior Departments fought heatedly 
over control of the Forest Service, as well as over policies for mitigating the Dust Bowl.
These conflicts unsurprisingly resulted in a certain amount of pathological bureau-
cratic infighting. However, they also arguably generated competition to develop more 
effective policies. The reason was simple: anyone who wanted to convince Roosevelt 
to adopt a particular approach rather than competing alternatives had to produce a 
well-crafted policy that would also achieve the president’s policy goals. For exam-
ple, Schlesinger (1958, pp. 349, 535) notes that competition between Agriculture 
and Interior “spurred each Department to redouble its efforts in the conservation 
cause,” and feuds over public works stimulated “more effective accomplishment” 
of public goals. Historians (Leuchtenburg 1963, pp. 328–29) and political scientists 
(Bendor 1985) have followed Schlesinger in concluding that administrative competi-
tion played a crucial role in the development of New Deal policies.
Moreover, far from being concerned about the ideological biases of his advisors, 
Roosevelt found it useful to draw on a wide range of sources for proposals. As he said 
in 1944, “You sometimes find something pretty good in the lunatic fringe. In fact, we 
have got as part of our social and economic government today a whole lot of things 
which in my boyhood were considered lunatic fringe, and yet they are now part of 
everyday life.”1 Policy developers within the administration thus included Democrats, 
Republicans, bankers like Joseph P. Kennedy, and leftists like Harry Hopkins. In fact, 
the administration appeared to be “composed of human opposites put into their posi-
tions with the specific intent of generating conflict” (Gerlak and McGovern 1999, 
p. 70).
In this paper, we analyze the role of competition and extremism in an all-pay 
contest model, in which policy developers exert costly effort to improve the quality 
of proposals that they make to a decision maker. Contest models have been used to 
study lobbying (e.g., Tullock 1980; Baye, Kovenock, and Vries 1993; Che and Gale 
1998), but most models focus on the allocation of a prize, rather than the adoption 
of a policy. Our model differs from this literature in several respects. First, the actors 
1 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16513 (accessed April 5, 2014). 
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are policy-motivated, and value winning only as a means to achieve their policy 
goals. Second, although actors have ideological disagreements, they also have com-
mon interests, in the sense of preferring high-quality policies over low-quality ones. 
Finally, actors choose both the quality and the ideology of their proposals, which 
means that compromise can arise endogenously.
A key assumption of our model is that any quality developed to improve a policy 
proposal is specific to that proposal (see also Londregan 2000; Ting 2011; Hirsch 
and Shotts 2012). This assumption contrasts with models of endogenous acquisition 
of general expertise, in which an expert worries that a decision maker will expro-
priate her investments to achieve different policy goals (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel 
1989). As shown by Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) and Callander’s (2008) models of 
informal authority, expertise that is non- or partially-transferable has strategic prop-
erties that are very different from general expertise. In our model, a policy developer 
can obtain informal agenda power by exploiting policy-specific quality to compel 
the decision maker to accept policies that promote her ideological interests. This 
setup is appropriate for analyzing effort that is strategically expended to craft a par-
ticular proposal—for example, as head of the Public Works Administration, Harold 
Ickes did not develop ideas for shovel-ready projects that he opposed, and instead 
focused on developing detailed plans for long-run infrastructure projects that he 
hoped would be adopted (Schlesinger 1958, pp. 281–89).
Our model generates several insights about competitive policy development. 
First, we show that competition always benefits the decision maker. Absent competi-
tion, a monopolistic policy developer would craft policies that promote her interests 
without providing much benefit to the decision maker. Competition serves to disci-
pline policy developers, forcing them to craft policies that are closer to the decision 
maker’s ideal point, and often higher quality.
Second, we assess a natural intuition: that a decision maker would prefer pol-
icy developers whose ideologies are closely aligned with his own, to ensure that 
they develop policies in line with his own preferences. However, consistent with the 
experience of the Roosevelt administration, we show that it is actually better to have 
competing policy developers with divergent preferences, whose intense desire to 
affect policy motivates them to exert effort to develop high-quality proposals.
Finally, we show that although the decision maker, ceteris paribus, prefers mod-
erate policies, the model generates endogenous extremism of policy choices and 
outcomes. That is, the decision maker benefits from extreme policy proposals, and 
chooses them over moderate ones. This happens because quality is endogenous, 
and a policy developer who makes an extreme proposal will exert sufficient effort 
improving its quality to overcompensate the decision maker for his ideological 
losses. Our model thus provides an account for why extremist policy developers may 
be present in the policymaking arena, successful in getting their policies enacted, 
and beneficial for moderates.
I. The Model
Two entrepreneurs, left and right ( L, R ), develop competing policies for consider-
ation by a decision maker ( D ). A policy (  y, q ) consists of an ideology  y ∈ ℝ and a 
level of quality  q ∈ [0,  ∞) =  ℝ + . The ideology dimension captures any aspect of 
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 policy over which players disagree, which could be classical left-right political ideol-
ogy but also distributional considerations such as organizational “turf.’’ The quality 
dimension captures policy features valued by all players, such as cost savings, effi-
cient administration, or economic growth. All players care about the ideology and 
quality of the policy that is ultimately chosen, an assumption that differs from most 
previous contest models, in which participants’ utility for losing the contest is fixed 
(e.g., Siegel 2009). Utility functions take the form  U i ( y, q) = q −  ( x i − y) 2 , where 
x i is player  i’s ideological ideal point. The decision maker’s ideal point is normalized 
to be  x D = 0 , and the entrepreneurs are on either side ( x L < 0 and  x R > 0 ).
The game has two stages. In the policy development stage, the entrepreneurs 
simultaneously craft policies  ( y i ,  q i ) . Producing quality  q i on a policy with ideol-
ogy  y i costs  c i ( q i ) =  α i  q i up-front, reflecting the investment of time and resources 
required to develop a well-designed policy proposal. For simplicity, the marginal 
cost of generating quality is constant, independent of ideology, and greater than the 
marginal benefit ( α i > 1 ).
In the policy choice stage, the decision maker chooses one of the two new pol-
icies or a reservation policy. This is assumed to be  (0, 0) , capturing the idea that 
the decision maker lacks policy-development capacity, and so will simply select a 
poorly designed policy that reflects his ideological preferences. The decision maker 
also cannot transfer quality generated for one policy to another policy; in the termi-
nology of Hirsch and Shotts (2012) it is policy-specific. For example, if an entre-
preneur invests time and effort to develop an effective and equitable school voucher 
program, the decision maker cannot expropriate those investments to develop an 
alternative policy that improves the quality of public schools.
For most of the analysis, we consider a symmetric variant in which the entre-
preneurs are equally extreme ( |  x L | =  x R = x ) and equally skilled at developing 
quality ( α L =  α R = α ). The parameter  x represents the extremism of ideological 
interests in the policymaking arena relative to the decision maker, and  α captures the 
efficiency of the technology for generating high-quality policies.
A. Preliminaries
Absent competition, our model is similar to Snyder’s (1991) model of vote-buying 
without price discrimination. A policy “monopolist” develops a policy that balances 
the marginal ideological benefit of moving policy in her direction against the mar-
ginal cost of producing just enough quality to obtain the decision maker’s approval.2 
The decision maker is left no better off than with the reservation policy, because the 
monopolist extracts all the benefits of quality in the form of ideological rents.
With competition, the model is a variant of an all-pay contest (Siegel 2009), with 
some distinctive properties that we highlight later. As in Che and Gale (2003), bids ( y i ,  q i ) are  two-dimensional, and there is a score function  s ( y i ,  q i ) determining the 
winner. In our model, a policy’s score is the utility it provides to the decision maker 
 s ( y, q) =  U D ( y, q) = q −  y 2 , because the decision maker cannot commit in 
advance to which policy he will choose.
2 See also Hitt, Volden, and Wiseman’s (2014) analysis of legislative effectiveness. 
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For most of the analysis, we rewrite strategies and utilities in terms of the score. 
With this transformation, an entrepreneur effectively chooses a target level of util-
ity  s i to offer to the decision maker, and a combination of ideology  y i and quality 
 q i =  s i +  y i 2 to achieve that target. Quality costs  α i ( s i +  y i 2 ) to produce, so more 
ideologically extreme policies—while better for the entrepreneur in the event of 
adoption—are more costly up-front because they require greater investments in 
quality to achieve the same utility for the decision maker.
In Lemma 1 in the online Appendix, we show that all equilibria satisfy intuitive 
conditions. Each entrepreneur  i ’s strategy can be described by two components: a uni-
variate cumulative distribution funtion (CDF)  F i ( s i ) over scores, and a unique ide-
ology  y i ( s i ) for each score  s i > 0, capturing how she trades off quality investments 
and ideological demands. The entrepreneurs mix smoothly over a common non-empty 
interval of scores  [0,  s ̅] , so there are no atoms or ties. Finally, at least one entrepreneur 
k is always active, in the sense of developing a policy that is strictly better for the deci-
sion maker than the reservation policy  ( F k (0) = 0 ). Using these properties, we now 
heuristically derive the equilibrium strategies and results. Technical details are in the 
online Appendix.3
B. Optimal Ideologies
An entrepreneur’s utility from a policy with score  s and ideology  y is  V i (s, y) =  U i ( y, s +  y 2 ) = − x i 2 + s + 2 x i y . This is linearly increasing in score holding 
ideology fixed, and it is also linear in ideological movements holding score fixed; 
that is, moving along the decision maker’s indifference curves. Entrepreneur  i ’s util-
ity for developing a policy  ( s i ,  y i )  with score  s i > 0 is
(1)  Π i ( s i ,  y i ;  F −i (⋅) ,  y −i (⋅) ) = − α i ( s i +  y i 2 ) +  F −i ( s i ) ⋅  V i ( s i ,  y i ) 
 +  ∫  s i  ∞  V i ( s −i ,  y −i ( s −i ) ) d F −i . 
The first term is the up-front cost of producing quality, and the second is the prob-
ability of victory multiplied by the policy payoff. The third term is  i’s policy utility 
when losing.
We note two properties of equation (1) that arise from our assumptions that the 
entrepreneurs invest in quality, and are purely policy-motivated. First, unlike Che 
and Gale (2003), there is no pure all-pay component of the strategies. Quality has 
a marginal up-front cost of  α i , but with probability  F −i ( s i ) the policy is adopted 
and yields an intrinsic marginal benefit of  1 . This means that the entrepreneurs are 
more willing to invest in improving the quality of policies that are more likely to be 
adopted, because they are also more likely to enjoy the intrinsic benefits. Second, 
because an entrepreneur cares about policy, rather than winning per se,  calculating 
her utility when she loses requires integrating over all the endogenous policies 
 ( s −i ,  y −i ( s −i ) ) in her opponent’s strategy that would defeat her own. Thus, there are 
rank-order spillovers (Baye, Kovenock, and Vries 2012), in the sense that the win-
ner’s strategy has a direct effect on the loser’s utility.
3 The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash. We restrict attention to equilibria in which the players use 
strategies that are the sum of an absolutely continuous and a discrete distribution. 
1651HIRSCH AND SHOTTS: COmpeTITIve pOlICy DevelOpmeNTvOl. 105 NO. 4
We now characterize an entrepreneur’s optimal combination of ideology and 
quality at every score. The key simplification is that holding the probability of win-
ning (i.e., score) fixed,  i ’s policy only affects her utility when she wins, and her 
opponent’s policy only affects her utility when she loses. Thus, the only aspect of 
 −i ’s strategy that affects  i’s optimal combination of ideology and quality at score  s i 
is the probability  F −i ( s i ) that  −i develops a lower-score policy, which is equal to the 
probability that  i ’s policy wins. Taking the first-order condition of equation (1) with 
respect to  y i then yields the optimal policy at each score.
OBSERVATION 1: With probability  1 an entrepreneur’s policies  ( s i ,  y i ) are either 
 0 -quality and never win, or satisfy  y i =  y i ∗ ( s i ) =  (  x i  __  α i )  F −i ( s i ) .
Note that the observation relies on properties of the equilibrium score CDFs—in 
particular, the absence of atoms above  0 and the fact that one entrepreneur is always 
active—that are proven in Lemma 1 in the online Appendix.
Observation 1 yields several insights about the connection between ideology 
and quality when both are chosen by strategic actors. First, more ideologically 
extreme entrepreneurs produce more  ideologically extreme policies ceteris pari-
bus, because they are more willing to pay the sure costs of developing quality for 
the uncertain benefits of ideological gains. Second, more skilled entrepreneurs (i.e., 
lower  α i ) also produce more extreme policies ceteris paribus, because they are bet-
ter able to generate quality and exploit it to realize ideological gains. Finally, more 
 ideologically extreme policies in the support of an entrepreneur’s strategy are not 
just higher quality—they are also strictly better for the decision maker, and more 
likely to be adopted. The entrepreneurs therefore  overcompensate the  decision 
maker for his ideological losses when they develop more extreme policies.
The equilibrium association between extremism, quality, and decision maker 
utility is counterintuitive, but it emerges naturally from the entrepreneurs’ incen-
tives. Policies  ( s i ,  y i ) that are better for the decision maker have a higher probability 
 F −i ( s i ) of adoption, so an entrepreneur is more willing to pay the certain quality 
costs of proposing a more extreme ideology in exchange for the uncertain ideologi-
cal gains in the event of victory.
C. Equilibrium Score Conditions
To derive the equilibrium score CDFs  ( F i ,  F −i ) , note that every score  s i ∈  [0,  s ̅] 
in the common support of the entrepreneurs’ score CDFs must maximize  i’s utility 
when the optimal policies  y i ∗ (s) are developed: i.e., with probability 1  i chooses a 
 s i ∈ arg  max  s i    { Π i ( s i ,  y i ∗ ( s i ) ;  F −i (⋅) ,  y −i ∗ (⋅) ) } . Since  i is indifferent over all scores in [0,  s ̅] , differentiating  Π i ( s i ,  y i ∗ ( s i ) ;  F −i (⋅) ,  y −i ∗ (⋅) ) with respect to  s i and setting it equal to 
zero yields a pair of differential equations that must be jointly satisfied in equilibrium,
(2)  α i −  F −i (s) ⋅ 1 =  f −i (s) ⋅ 2 x i ( (  x i  __  α i )  F −i (s) −  (  x −i  ___ α −i  )  F i (s) ) 
 ∀ s ∈  [0,  s ̅] and i ∈  { L, R} .
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Equation (2) has a natural interpretation. The left side is  i’s net marginal cost of 
increasing the score she offers: she pays  α i > 1 to generate additional quality, but 
with probability  F −i (s) she wins and enjoys the marginal benefit, 1, of that additional 
quality. The right side is  i’s marginal ideological gain from increasing her score: 
with probability  f −i (s) she goes from losing to winning the contest, which shifts the 
outcome from  y −i ∗ (s) =  (  x −i  ___ α −i  )  F i (s) to  y i ∗ (s) =  (  x i  __  α i )  F −i (s) .
Notably, the entrepreneurs’ policy motivation and the resulting rank-order spill-
overs induce a mutual dependence between the equilibrium score CDFs. The reason 
is that entrepreneur  i’s score CDF directly affects the ideology of her opponent’s 
policy at each score. In particular, if  i starts to drop out of the contest (a higher 
 F i (s) ), her opponent’s equilibrium response is to be more ideologically aggressive (a 
more extreme  y −i ∗ (s) ). Because  i is policy-motivated, this increases the harm to her 
of dropping out. The entrepreneurs’ policy motivation thus magnifies the intensity 
of competition in the model.
D. Equilibrium of the Symmetric Model
We now heuristically derive the unique equilibrium of the symmetric model; 
details are in the proof of Proposition 1. The equilibrium involves a common 
score CDF  F (s) satisfying  F (0) = 0 , i.e., both entrepreneurs are always active. 
Applying symmetry to equation (2), we then obtain the single differential equa-
tion  α − F (s) = f  (s) ⋅ 4   x 2  __α F (s) . A simpler equation may be derived on the inverse 
 F −1 (F ) by substituting in  F −1 (F ) for  s and observing that  1 ______ 
f  ( F −1 (F ) ) =  
∂ __ ∂ F( F −1 (F ) ) , 
which produces
(3)  ∂ ___ ∂ F( F −1 (F ) ) = 4 x 2 ( F / α _____ α − F) . 
Solving and applying the boundary condition  F (0) = 0 ⇔  F −1 (0) = 0 (i.e., both 
entrepreneurs are always active) then yields the unique equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1: The inverse of the common equilibrium score CDF in the sym-
metric model is  F −1 (F ) = 4 x 2 (ln ( α ____ α − F) −  F __α) , and equilibrium proposal ideol-
ogies are  y i (s) = sign( x i ) ⋅  x __ αF(s) .
The equilibrium can be expressed more intuitively in terms of a common proba-
bility distribution  G ( y) over the ideological extremism of entrepreneurs’ proposals, 
and a function  s ( y) that maps the ideological extremism of each policy to its score 
(recall that the quality  q ( y) of a policy with ideological extremism  y is  s ( y) +  y 2 ). 
From Observation 1,  y (s) =  x __ αF (s) ⇔ s ( y) =  F −1 ( y ___ x / α) . To derive  G(y) , observe 
that the probability that an entrepreneur develops a policy less extreme than  y is 
also the probability  F(s(y)) that she develops a lower-score policy,  F ( F −1 ( y ___ x / α) ) =  y ___ 
x / α. We thus obtain the following result.
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COROLLARY 1: In equilibrium, the ideological extremism of the entrepreneurs’ 
policies is uniformly distributed over  [0,  x __ α] , and the score  s ( y) of a policy with 
extremism  y is  4x ( x ln ( x ____ x − y) − y) .
II. Equilibrium Properties
The equilibrium strategies of the competitive symmetric model are illustrated 
in Figure 1 in ideology-quality space. For purposes of comparison, the figure also 
shows the monopoly policy that each entrepreneur would develop absent compe-
tition. In the competitive equilibrium, the entrepreneurs mix smoothly over devel-
oping policies located on two symmetric curves that extend from  (0, 0) out to 
 (± x __ α,  s ̅+ ( x __ α) 2 ) . The distribution of each entrepreneur’s policies projected onto the 
ideology ( x )-axis is uniform.
A. Benefits of Competition
As a monopolist, each entrepreneur would produce a noncentrist policy with just 
enough quality to make the decision maker indifferent with the reservation  policy. 
Competition forces the entrepreneurs to moderate the ideology of their propos-
als. Although they do not always produce policies that are higher quality than the 
monopoly policy, their proposals are always strictly better for the decision maker. 
Thus, the decision maker always benefits from competition. This result contrasts 
with Rotemberg and Saloner’s (1994) argument that firms benefit from narrowing 
their focus and eliminating internal competition. A key difference is that entrepre-
neurs in our model care about the policy outcome even if they lose, which intensifies 
productive competition.
B. Endogenous Extremism
A property of equilibrium is that the decision maker always chooses the more 
ideologically extreme proposal: in Figure 1, more-extreme proposals are located on 
higher decision maker indifference (i.e., score) curves. The decision maker’s pref-
erence for policies on the “lunatic fringe” emerges endogenously from the entrepre-
neurs’ strategic incentives to invest in quality. Because they are only interested in 
influencing outcomes, entrepreneurs never develop an extreme policy unless they 
also make the up-front investments necessary to give it a high chance of success 
(see Observation 1).
While this prediction is no doubt unusual, it is important to recall that policy 
entrepreneurs in the real world may propose extreme policies for reasons other than a 
desire to influence outcomes. For example, they may engage in position-taking, i.e., 
making proposals that are unlikely to succeed, in order to please certain constituen-
cies. Or, they may have intrinsic preferences over their policy proposals irrespective 
of the outcome. These factors would make it more difficult to observe our predic-
tion in real-world policymaking. At a minimum, however, our model shows that 
empirical studies should take into account how strategic actors endogenously affect 
difficult-to-observe features of the policies that they propose (Triossi, Valdivieso, 
and Villena-Roldán 2014).
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The decision maker’s endogenous preference for extreme policies also generates 
equilibrium polarization in policy outcomes. As shown in Figure 2, more-extreme 
policies have higher density than less-extreme ones within the interval  [−  x __ α,  x __ α] . 
While polarization is often perceived as being a sign of political dysfunction, in our 
model it arises from ideologically motivated actors’ productive engagement in the 
policy process.
C. Comparative Statics
The consequences of having more ideologically extreme (higher  x ) and/or more 
skilled (lower  α ) entrepreneurs are simple to derive from the CDF over ideology 
 G ( y) =  y ___ 
x / α, the inverse CDF over score  F −1 (F ) from Proposition 1, and 
the inverse CDF  H −1 ( H ) over quality, which is equal to  F −1 ( H ) +  ( H  x __ α) 2 
because  q ( y) = s ( y) +  y 2 .4
PROPOSITION 2: As the entrepreneurs become more extreme (higher  x ) or more 
skilled (lower  α ), their proposals become first-order stochastically more extreme, 
but also first-order stochastically higher quality and better for the decision maker.
Polarized entrepreneurs naturally produce ideologically extreme policies. 
However, as the entrepreneurs become more polarized their disagreement actually 
benefits the decision maker, because they invest more in quality. They have two rea-
sons for doing this. First, they care more intensely about ideological gains. Second, 
4 The decision maker’s equilibrium utility is  ∫ 0  s ̅  ∂ __ ∂ s( [F (s) ] 2 ) s ⋅ ds =  ∫ 0 1  ∂ __ ∂ F( F 2 )  F −1 (F ) ⋅ dF . 
Figure 1. Equilibrium Strategies in the Symmetric Model
Notes: Each entrepreneur produces policies with ideologies uniformly distributed over the 
interval  [0,  ±  x __ α] . The dashed curves represent the policies that the entrepreneurs produce at 
each ideological location in the support of their strategies. In equilibrium, the entrepreneurs’ 
policies generate utilities for the decision maker (scores) that lie on a common interval  [0,  s ̅] . 
The monopoly policy that each would produce absent competition is depicted as a dot on the 
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each entrepreneur wants to prevent the other’s increasingly extreme policies from 
being adopted.
The effect of increasing the entrepreneurs’ skill is actually similar to the effect of 
ideological polarization. Entrepreneurs who are better able to generate high-quality 
policies attempt to exploit that ability to achieve ideological gains, which results in 
extreme policy proposals, but also benefits the decision maker. Thus, an increase 
in observed policy extremism may occur as a by-product of greater skill at policy 
development, and does not necessarily indicate that actors with centrist preferences 
are worse off.
D. Entrepreneurs’ Utility
So far we have focused on how competitive policy development affects the deci-
sion maker, showing that he chooses more extreme (endogenous) policies over less 
extreme ones, benefits from competition, and prefers to have more skilled entrepre-
neurs despite the greater policy extremism that results. We now turn to the entrepre-
neurs, and show that these results do not, in general, extend to them.
First, for reasonable values of the cost parameter  (α ≥ 3) each entrepreneur 
prefers the moderate policies within the support of her opponent’s strategy, since the 
additional quality of extreme ones is insufficient to compensate for her ideological 
losses. Thus, disagreement between the entrepreneurs endures even after they have 
made common-value investments in their respective policies.
Second, each entrepreneur is always harmed by the presence of a competitor.5 
In addition, for most values of  α ( >  α ̅ ≈ 1.23 ) the entrepreneurs would prefer to 
jointly give up policy development capacity and allow the decision maker to choose 
the reservation policy. The decision maker is thus the main beneficiary of com-
petitive policy development, even though the entrepreneurs make common-value 
investments. This feature is shared with common agency models of influence (Dixit, 
5 The entrepreneurs’ equilibrium utility is  Π i ∗ ( s ̅; F ) = −α ( s ̅+  ( x / α) 2 ) +  V i ( s ̅,  x i / α) = − (1 − 1 / α)  x 2 − (α − 1)  s ̅, i.e., their utility from producing score  s ̅ =  F −1 (1) with ideology  ± x __ α and winning for sure. 






Figure 2. Density of Ideological Outcome
Note: The density of the final ideological outcome resulting from the competitive symmetric 
equilibrium, which is  
| y |
 ____  ( x / α) 2 within the interval  [−  x __ α,  x __ α] and  0 elsewhere.
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Grossman, and Helpman 1997), where equal and opposing interest groups are hurt 
by competition because influence is costly and policy is unchanged.
Finally, for  α >  α ̂ ≈ 2.11 the entrepreneurs are harmed by shared improve-
ments in their skill at policy development, because of the greater ideological 
extremism of their policies, as well as the more intense competition over quality. We 
summarize these observations below.
PROPOSITION 3: The entrepreneurs (i) prefer their opponents’ more moderate 
equilibrium policies to their more extreme ones when  α ≥ 3 , (ii) prefer being a 
monopolist to facing competition, (iii) prefer the reservation policy to the com-
petitive equilibrium when  α >  α ̅ > 1 , and (iv) prefer higher (common) costs of 
developing quality when  α >  α ̂ >  α ̅ .
Only when  α ∈  (1,  α ̅ ) , i.e., when the entrepreneurs come sufficiently close to valu-
ing quality for its own sake, do they benefit both from their joint ability to develop 
policies, and from further improvements in their skill.
III. Additional Questions
Overall, our model paints a picture of vigorous engagement by ideological 
extremists in a competitive policy environment, a pattern that is consistent with prior 
contest-theoretic models of social conflict (e.g., Esteban and Ray 1999). Unlike pre-
vious work, however, the key vehicle for competition is productive investments in 
quality, which are strategically useful because they are valued by a decision maker 
who freely chooses which policy to implement. Consequently, competition benefits 
the decision maker despite observably extreme ideological outcomes. In addition, 
the decision maker benefits from increasingly polarized policy developers.
We now discuss several variants of our model, to better understand these results 
and assess their robustness. We first consider alternative assumptions about the set 
of entrepreneurs, to see whether centrists are likely to be active in addition to, or 
instead of, the two extremists in our model. We next consider alternative assump-
tions about the entrepreneurs’ utilities and strategies, analyzing what happens if they 
disagree about “quality,” if they can sabotage each other’s policies, or if they are 
dogmatically unwilling to compromise.6
A. An Entrepreneur Aligned with the Decision Maker
In our model, the decision maker is assumed to lack policy-development capac-
ity. However, some political leaders have direct subordinates who share their goals, 
as well as close allies that they could invite to develop policy proposals. A natural 
intuition is that the decision maker in our model would benefit if one of the extremist 
entrepreneurs were replaced by a centrist. In fact, the reverse is true: competition 
6 In related work (Hirsch and Shotts 2014b) we also consider the effects of granting veto rights to noncentrists, 
which is a common consequence of separation of powers and supermajority rules (Krehbiel l998). We show that 
veto players’ resistance to change can encourage policy developers to make even greater investments in quality. 
However, veto players who are too extreme instead induce harmful policy gridlock. 
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vanishes, the remaining extremist behaves as a monopolist, and the decision maker 
is no better off than with the reservation policy.
PROPOSITION 4: Fix  x L < 0 and  α L > 1. If  R is centrist ( x R =  x D = 0 ) and 
has any level of skill  ( α R > 1) , the unique equilibrium is as if she were absent. The 
left entrepreneur develops her monopoly policy, the right entrepreneur does noth-
ing, and the decision maker is no better off than with the reservation policy.
The reason for this result is simple: in our model, productive investments are 
inspired by the prospect of ideological gains. A centrist entrepreneur’s ideological 
interests are already protected by the decision maker, so to her, the left entrepre-
neur’s policies are equivalent to centrist policies with quality  s L . Her cost of devel-
oping higher-quality centrist policies  α R s R outweighs the benefit  s R −  s L , so she 
remains inactive.
B. Additional Entrepreneurs
In many policymaking environments, multiple actors could choose to enter the 
fray and develop new policies. We now consider what happens when additional 
moderate entrepreneurs are introduced between the two extremists in our model.
PROPOSITION 5: The equilibrium with two symmetric entrepreneurs  |  x L | =  x R = x and common costs  α remains an equilibrium when  N weakly 
 more-moderate ( | x j | ≤ x ) and less-skilled ( α j ≥ α ) entrepreneurs are present. In 
this equilibrium, the additional entrepreneurs are inactive.
When additional entrepreneurs are present who are (weakly) more moderate and 
no more skilled than the existing extremists, there always exists an equilibrium in 
which the more-moderate entrepreneurs allow two extremists to shoulder the burden 
of policy development.7 Compared to them, a moderate has less to gain from engag-
ing in the policy contest: she values ideological gains less, and already benefits from 
an aligned extremist’s participation. This suggests a tendency for individuals with 
more extreme ideological preferences to dominate policy contests.
C. Entrepreneurs Who Discount the Quality of Each Other’s Policies
In some political environments, there are nonpolicy costs to the losing faction 
that increase with the quality of the winning policy: for example, the winning fac-
tion’s strength may increase in future electoral, legislative, or bureaucratic contests. 
Moreover, “quality” may have very different meanings for factions on opposite sides 
of the political spectrum.8 For example, a teachers’ union may prefer that a voucher 
7 We do not rule out other equilibria. However, the equilibrium with two active extremists is unique if the addi-
tional entrepreneurs are at  x D = 0 . 
8 However, Kendall, Nannicini, and Trebbi’s (2015) study of Italian voters suggests that some voters don’t 
discount the quality of ideologically distant policies or candidates. 
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system be inefficient, cumbersome, and unreliable, because this would deter parents 
from pulling their children out of the public schools.
As a reduced form for analyzing such considerations, we check whether our 
results are robust to assuming that each entrepreneur places a lower, zero, or even 
negative value on the quality of her opponent’s policies. Suppose each entrepreneur 
i values the quality of her opponent’s policies at  (1 − β )  q −i , where  β ≥ 0 , so that 
 i ’s payoff from  −i ’s policy is  V i ( s −i ,  y −i ) − β ( s −i +  y −i 2 ) . With this setup, each entre-
preneur effectively faces a higher cost of losing the contest. Solving this variant of 
our model yields the following results.
PROPOSITION 6: For all  β ≥ 0 there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which 
(i) the ideology of equilibrium policies is the same as in the baseline model, (ii) 
Proposition 2 holds, (iii) the quality and score of the entrepreneurs’ policies and 
the final policy outcome are first-order stochastically increasing in  β , and (iv) the 
marginal effect of extremism  x on the decision maker’s utility is increasing in  β .9
This proposition shows that our main results are actually strengthened when entre-
preneurs discount each other’s quality. Policy outcomes are no more ideologically 
extreme, but are higher quality. Moreover, the benefits of extremism are stronger, 
in the sense that the marginal benefit to the decision maker of greater polarization 
is higher. These effects arise for the same reasons as our main results: the entrepre-
neurs’ dislike of each other’s policies, whether for ideological or “quality” reasons, 
is funneled into productive investments.
D. Sabotage
An additional potential concern with our model is that real-world competition 
isn’t always productive; political factions sometimes interfere with policy imple-
mentation or engage in other forms of sabotage to shift policy decisions in their 
favor. Although a complete analysis of sabotage is beyond the scope of our paper,10 
we briefly comment on why we believe it is reasonable to expect costly political 
activity to focus on productive investments.
Consider a variant of our model in which each entrepreneur  i can also pay an 
up-front cost  α i sq i s to engage in sabotage and thereby reduce the quality of her oppo-
nent’s policy by  q i s . If each entrepreneur uses a combination of productive  investment 
and sabotage, then the decision maker prefers  i’s proposal over  −i’s proposal if and 
only if  ( q i −  q −i s ) −  y i 2 ≥  ( q −i −  q i s ) −  y −i 2 . Rearranging, this is equivalent to the 
decision maker’s utility from  i’s policy  q i −  y i 2 , plus  i’s level of sabotage  q i s , exceed-
ing that of her opponent.
What combination of investment  q i and sabotage  q i s will entrepreneur  i use? 
Clearly, if  i engages in sabotage and fails to win, then she is worse off because her 
sabotage reduces the quality of the actual policy outcome. Less obvious, however, 
is the fact that using sabotage also harms  i when she wins, because it redirects her 
9 Note that we do not assert for this variant that all equilibria are symmetric. 
10 In particular, it is an open question whether the decision maker benefits from extremism of entrepreneurs in 
equilibria that involve a combination of sabotage and productive investment. 
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effort away from productive investment. Thus, it can be shown that sabotage will 
only disrupt the equilibrium in Proposition 1 if its marginal cost is sufficiently lower 
than the marginal cost of investing in quality, i.e.,  α i s <  α i − 1 . Only when this 
condition holds is sabotage sufficiently cheap to compensate the entrepreneur for 
both the harm she does to her opponent’s policy, and the foregone value of investing 
in her own policy’s quality.11
Note that this analysis uses our baseline assumption that entrepreneurs fully 
value quality even when they lose. However, because sabotage is more appealing 
for entrepreneurs who don’t value each other’s quality, we generalize the analysis to 
cover that case as well.
PROPOSITION 7: If entrepreneur  i values  −i’s quality at  (1 − β )  q −i there exists 
an equilibrium without sabotage if and only if  α s ≥ α −  (1 − β ) . 
Discounting an opponent’s quality thus increases the range of  α s where sabotage 
must occur. Nevertheless, as long as the entrepreneurs place some positive weight 
on each other’s quality, sabotage can be absent even when it is strictly cheaper than 
investing in quality.12
E. Dogmatic Entrepreneurs
A final issue we consider has to with the fact that the entrepreneurs in the model 
are risk-averse over ideology. This implies that, compared to moderates, extremists 
place a higher value on small shifts away from the reservation policy, and thus are 
more willing to invest in quality to achieve ideological gains. Although risk aver-
sion is a standard assumption in the literature, it cannot capture the preferences of 
one type of political extremist: someone who only values policy done her way, and 
therefore places little or no weight on gains achieved via compromise.
We now consider how dogmatic, risk-loving entrepreneurs would influence our 
results. Suppose for simplicity that each entrepreneur’s utility function takes the 
form  U i ( y, q) = q +  1 y= x i  ⋅ B | x i | where  B ≥ 0 , so that she receives a net benefit of 
B | x i | whenever her ideal policy is chosen, but is indifferent over all other ideological 
outcomes. As in our baseline model, each entrepreneur’s benefit from getting her 
ideal is increasing in her extremism. But unlike our baseline model, she only values 
her ideal ideological outcome and thus is strongly risk-loving. The preferences of 
the decision maker remain unchanged.
In contrast to our main model, a dogmatic entrepreneur will only develop pos-
itive-score policies at her own ideal point, because she doesn’t value compromise 
victories. Thus each entrepreneur’s  F i (0) must be sufficiently high to make her oppo-
nent  −i willing to develop a proposal at  x −i with quality  q −i ≥  x −i 2 . Conditional on 
developing a proposal, each entrepreneur mixes over a range of  positive scores. 
11 Konrad (2000) shows that sabotage often is not an optimal strategy in multiplayer rent-seeking contests; our 
analysis differs because we consider only two players, and quality investments are directly productive. 
12 Similarly, if sabotage only makes the policy less appealing to the decision maker (e.g., if it is negative cam-
paigning) then an equilibrium with no sabotage exists if and only if  α s ≥ α . 
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The following proposition analyzes equilibria, including the one that is decision 
maker-optimal.
PROPOSITION 8: With dogmatic entrepreneurs, there exists an equilibrium in 
which the decision maker’s utility is strictly positive if and only if  x ∈  (0,  B ____ α − 1) . 
The online Appendix characterizes a symmetric equilibrium in which decision maker 
utility is (i) weakly greater than in any other equilibrium, (ii) continuous, and (iii) 
strictly quasiconcave over  x ∈  [0,  B ____ α − 1] . 
Thus, when the entrepreneurs have uncompromising preferences, it is no longer true 
that more polarization always benefits the decision maker. Instead, extremism is 
only good up to a point. It can spur investments in quality, but eventually the entre-
preneurs’ cost of compensating the decision maker for their ideal policies becomes 
so high that they drop out of the contest.
Note that developing a  0 -quality extreme policy in lieu of the reservation policy 
is also consistent with equilibrium: such a policy is free, will never be adopted, and 
so is effectively  0 -score. “Inactivity” by dogmatic extremists in the real world may 
thus be manifested as a form of position-taking: proposing low-quality policies that 
are hopelessly extreme.
IV. Related Literature
Our model provides a new approach to studying competition for intra- and 
inter-organizational influence. The key features that determine its empirical domain 
are (i) open competition, (ii) a significant common value element of policy prefer-
ences, and (iii) the potential for common value investments that are up-front and 
noncontractible, nontransferable across policies, and verifiable.
A now-vast literature considers the strategic properties of common value invest-
ments by experts in acquiring information about an unknown state of the world. The 
investments are typically modeled as noncontractible, nonverifiable, and pertaining 
to a common additive shift across a continuum of policies. Such models have been 
widely applied within political science to study the institutional determinants of 
high-quality policies (Gailmard and Patty 2012). They also feature information that 
is effectively transferable across policies, a property that Callander (2008) terms 
“invertibility” and criticizes for being unrealistic. Single-expert models typically 
deliver “ally principle” results in which a decision maker prefers to listen or dele-
gate to someone who shares her policy preferences (e.g., Crawford and Sobel 1982, 
Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). Results from multi-expert models are more diverse 
(Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989, Battaglini 2002) but very sensitive to  technical assump-
tions (Ambrus and Takahashi 2008). Another odd feature of competitive signal-
ing models is that each expert benefits from the other expert’s presence, due to the 
reduced variance of policy outcomes. In our policy development model, in contrast, 
each entrepreneur would prefer to be a monopolist rather than having to compete.
A growing literature studies noncontractible investments by single experts that 
are partially or fully nontransferable across policies, in settings both verifiable 
(Londregan 2000; Ting 2011; Hirsch and Shotts 2012) and nonverifiable (Aghion 
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and Tirole 1997; Callander 2008). The inherent protection afforded by nontrans-
ferability has important strategic implications; experts attempt to exploit their 
monopoly power over investments to compel decision makers to accept policies 
that promote their interests. In these settings, an expert with divergent preferences is 
often preferable to one with aligned preferences, provided that there are institutional 
constraints on her use of informal agenda power (Hirsch and Shotts 2012, 2014a).
Another class of competitive models analyzes political influence via transfers 
(Groseclose and Snyder 1996; Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997). Intrafirm 
competition is also analyzed by several authors, including Milgrom and Roberts 
(1988) and Lazear and Rosen (1981). Many of these models assume contractibil-
ity. Within political institutions, however, nominal principals typically have sharply 
limited means to control their subordinates (Moe 1984) and formal commitment 
is often impossible due to the lack of external enforcement. In some environments 
lacking formal contracts, repetition makes it possible to create informal relational 
ones (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002). However, this is less feasible in polit-
ical environments, where many decision makers are short-lived (Heclo 1977).13 
Moreover, as was the case in the early years of the New Deal, political leaders typ-
ically face a high degree of urgency to enact policy on a given issue—as noted in 
Kingdon’s (1995) classic book, “policy windows” open only briefly. This urgency 
further undermines leaders’ ability to pressure subordinates to develop better policy 
proposals. In our model, competition is such a disciplining device.
The idea that disagreement can be beneficial also appears in other models with 
very different microfoundations. Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2009) consider a 
model in which decision making and implementation are delegated by a firm owner 
to separate actors, whose biases can help counterbalance each other. Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1999) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) develop models in which com-
petition provides incentives for actors to produce public or verifiable information to 
influence a decision.14
Finally, we note that variants of our model could be applied to other environ-
ments where actors propose policies and compete to have them enacted by exerting 
costly effort, e.g., lobbying (Epstein and Nitzan 2004; Jordan and Meirowitz 2012), 
valence competition in elections (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2009), and 
judicial opinion writing (Lax and Cameron 2007). In many such models, it would 
be natural to analyze the simultaneous choice of ideology and effort. However, to 
the best of our knowledge, previous research has focused on models in which actors 
choose ideological and nonideological offers sequentially, rather than analyzing 
them as two components simultaneously chosen in an all-pay contest.
V. Conclusion
We have presented a model of policy development in which factions have different 
ideologies or preferences, yet also agree on certain common objectives. Competing 
13 Most high-level political appointees in the US Federal Government stay for less than 18 months, and their 
subordinates are keenly aware of this fact. 
14 In these two models—unlike Crawford and Sobel (1982)—experts also don’t care about the state, so its real-
ization will align the decision maker’s preference with one or the other’s interests. 
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policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive, policy-spe-
cific investments to improve the quality of their proposals. Rather than being tai-
lored narrowly to any specific institution, our model is designed to capture features 
of many different political organizations, including legislatures, parties, democratic 
polities, non-governmental organizations, militaries, and government agencies.
The key features of our model’s empirical domain are that different actors can 
develop policies for consideration by a decision maker, and that policy consists of 
both a common values component and a component over which actors disagree. For 
example, the commissions in charge of some US government agencies have multi-
ple members with different preferences, and even if a single decision maker like the 
board median is ultimately decisive, the other board members have the opportunity 
to develop policy proposals. Similarly, a wide range of interest groups are allowed to 
make policy suggestions in notice and comment procedures for regulatory rule-mak-
ing. Our model suggests that these institutions promote beneficial policy development 
competition. It also suggests an explanation for the importance of programmatic par-
ties in promoting effective governance in developing countries.15 Parties with strong 
policy preferences have an incentive to invest in quality in order to increase their 
chances of gaining control of the government. Because a crucial form of quality in 
developing countries is choosing noncorrupt candidates for office, our model sug-
gests that countries with programmatic parties will exhibit lower levels of corruption 
when compared to countries where parties don’t have firm policy objectives.
Our analysis suggests several avenues for future work. One possibility is to ana-
lyze policy entrepreneurs’ choice about whether to use targeted benefits like pork or 
collective benefits like policy quality to acquire support for their proposals. Another 
possibility is to consider aspects of institutional design, including subsidies for pol-
icy development, endogenous selection of entrepreneurs, the addition of veto play-
ers, or the delegation of decision-making authority.
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